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	 All	 references	 are	 to	 the	 Vivès	 edition	 of	 Suárez’s	 Opera omnia.	 The	 Meta-







that	 Francisco	 Mayrone	 (d.	 ca.	 1328)	 defends	 the	 negative	 position	 for	 the	
sake	of	argument.	As	far	as	I	can	tell,	Mirandola	does	not	discuss	beings	of	
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My	second	main	contention	is	that	Suárez	provides	an	interesting	and	
cogent	 response	 to	 this	 objection	 when	 arguing	 against	 ontological	
monism	 (§3).	 Suárez’s	 response	 to	 this	 objection	 forces	 us	 to	 distin-
guish	between	two	kinds	of	ontological	pluralism:	strict	and	non-strict.	
In	 the	 end	 it	 will	 become	 clear	 that	 Suárez’s	 pluralism	 is	 non-strict.	
Suárez’s	pluralism	presents	a	dialectical	option	not	currently	on	 the	
menu	of	contemporary	meta-metaphysics.







Suárez	 initially	 seems	 to	 affirm	 the	 positive	 position.	 The	 “true	
opinion,”	he	tells	us,	 is	 that	“there	are	[dari]3	some	beings	of	reason”	











































ment,	 and	 he	 develops	 a	 position	 according	 to	 which	 we	 can	 think	
about	 non-existent	 objects.	 Suárez’s	 view	 of	 non-existents	 has	 re-
ceived	some	scholarly	attention,	but	it	has	been	either	misrepresented	
or	not	fully	understood,	in	ways	that	will	become	clear	as	we	proceed.	
My	aim	 in	 this	paper	 is	 to	establish	what	 I	 take	 to	be	 the	definitive	
features	of	Suárez’s	view	of	nonexistent	objects	and	demonstrate	their	






















2. The Ontological Pluralist Interpretation
Suárez	himself	provides	the	resources	to	resolve	the	apparent	contra-
diction	between	(1)	and	(2).	In	support	of	his	view,	Suárez	cites	with	
















Suárez	 thinks	 we	 must	 posit	 beings	 of	 reason	 precisely	 because	
we	can	think	about	them	and	say	true	things	about	them.	Suárez	also	














To	be	only	objectively	in	reason	is	not	to	be	[non est esse] 
but	 to	 be	 cognized	 or	 made	 up.	 Thus	 the	 common	 de-
scription	 that	 can	 be	 given	 of	 the	 common	 concept	 of	
being	–	namely,	 that	which	has	being	–	really	does	not	
apply	to	beings	of	reason	[…]	a	being	of	reason	is	such	
that	being	cannot	apply	to	it	[ens autem rationis tale est ut ei 
repugnat esse].	[DM	54.1.10,	XXVI,	1018a]
medieval	period.	For	a	detailed	and	critical	 review	of	 the	major	views,	see	
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we	 would	 be	 involved	 in	 a	 contradiction”	 (DM	 54.1.7,	 XXVI,	 1017a).	
Here	he	is	assuming	that	a	being	of	reason	is	by	definition	something	
that	does	not	exist;	hence,	it	would	be	contradictory	to	say	that	beings	
of	 reason,	 which	 do	 not	 exist,	 exist.	 Yet	 Suárez	 has	 also	 stated	 that	
(1)	there	are	[dari aut esse]	beings	of	reason.	In	the	above	passage,	he	
explains	 that	when	he	makes	claims	such	as	(1),	we	are	 to	 interpret	
him	as	meaning	(1a).	In	exactly	the	same	way	and	for	exactly	the	same	
reasons,	when	Suárez	makes	claims	such	as	 (2),	we	are	 to	 interpret	
him	as	meaning	(2a).
So	on	my	reading,	Suárez	is	an	ontological	pluralist	insofar	as	he	






































son,	 we	 do	 not	 mean	 that	 they	 are	 in	 reality	 according	
to	 true	existence,	otherwise	we	would	be	 involved	 in	a	
contradiction.	 […]	Such	beings	are	 therefore	 said	 to	 be	
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3. The Idle Hypothesis Objection
The	ontological	pluralist	interpretation	solves	the	exegetical	puzzle	in-
troduced	in	Section	1,	but	it	raises	a	new,	philosophical	problem	about	
















Suárez’s	 language	can	be	made	necessarily	equivalent	 to	 the	mo-
nist’s.	This	point	 is	 typically	made	nowadays	 in	 terms	of	quantifiers.	
Suárez	 uses	 quantifiers	 to	 express	 ontological	 claims,	 but	 he	 more	

































sides	 being	 an	 object	 for	 the	 intellect	 or	 reason	 think-
ing	about	it.	[…]	Therefore,	‘being	of	reason’	is	correctly	
defined	as	 that	which	has	being	only	objectively	 in	 the	
intellect,	or	that	which	is	cognized	by	reason	as	a	being,	



















such	 a	 concept	 requires	 that	 inferiors	 truly	 and	 intrinsi-
cally10	participate	in	the	form	signified	by	the	name.	But	





term	 ‘being’	 (and	 its	 cognates)	 cannot	 be	 subordinated	 to	 a	 single,	
common	 concept	 of	 being.	 Hence,	 univocity	 is	 false.	 As	 a	 first	 pass,	
the	argument	appears	to	run	as	follows.
Suárez’s argument against the univocity of being:
(1)	If	concept	C	is	common	to	x1,	x2,	…	xn,	then	C	signi-
fies	a	property	intrinsic	to	x1,	x2,	…	xn.













accompanying	 things,	 are”	 (Lewis	 2001:	 384).	 Here	 Lewis	 character-












Grounding	 theorists	 advocate	 taking	 such	 claims	 at	 face	 value,	 and	





the	 difference	 between	 intrinsic	 and	 extrinsic	 denominations.	 A	 character-
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column	in	virtue	of	 the	relative	positions	of	myself	and	this	column,	












































The grounding analysis of intrinsicality:
F	is	intrinsic	if	and	only	if,	as	a	matter	of	necessity,	for	all	x:	
(i) If	x	is	F	in	virtue	of	φ(y)	—	where	φ(y)	is	a	fact	



















17.	 The	application	of	Rosen’s	analysis	of	extrinsicality	 to	extrinsic	being	 I	am	
borrowing	from	Embry	(2017).










efficient	 causes	 strictly	 speaking,	 since	 efficient	 causes	 bring	 things	


























of	 reason,	 nevertheless	 necessarily	 presupposes	 some	
real	 being,	 in	 which	 it	 is	 grounded	 [fundetur],	 or	 from	

















or	 facts	 about	 objective	 being,	 are	 grounded	 in	 some-
thing	outside	of	the	objective	beings	themselves.






way	 of	 being,	 one	 of	 those	 ways	 of	 being	—	objective	 being	—	is	 not	
20.	Suárez	also	allows	that	objective	being	can	be	grounded	in	acts	of	the	imagi-
nation	(DM	54.2.18,	XXVI,	1023b).





















tive	 semantic	 fundamentality	 of	 certain	 terms	 in	 a	 mental	 language,	
and	it	states:
The weak common concept principle: Any	concept	of	an	ex-
trinsic	property	has	a	decomposition	into	more	basic	con-
cepts	of	intrinsic	properties	and	relations.









3b. The common concept principle
So	here	is	where	we	stand:	Suárez	rejects	the	univocity	of	being	with	




To	 answer	 this	 question,	 return	 for	 a	 moment	 to	 Suárez’s	 argument	
against	the	generic	concept	of	being:
But	a	common	concept	[of	being]	has	no	place	here,	since	
such	 a	 concept	 requires	 that	 inferiors	 truly	 and	 intrinsi-
cally	 participate	 in	 the	 form	 signified	 by	 the	 name.	 But	
















24.	 Alternatively,	 [a	 goat-stag	 has	 being]	 is	 grounded	 in	 a	 fact	 containing	 a	
thought	about	a	goat-stag.








Suárez	assumes	 that	 the	semantically	primitive	 terms	 in	our	mental	
language	are	resemblance-tracking.	But	terms	that	pick	out	extrinsic	
properties	are	not	resemblance-tracking.	For	example,	the	property	of	
being	made	of	 tin	or	close	 to	something	made	of	 tin	does	not	 track	
resemblance-making	features	of	the	world:	 it	can	be	shared	by	a	tin	
can	and	a	pile	of	cat	food.	Suárez	concludes	that	our	concept	of	such	
a	 property,	 if	 we	 have	 one,	 is	 semantically	 derivative.	 The	 common	




derivative	 on	 a	 more	 specific	 concept	 of	 being	 that	 is	 resemblance	
tracking.28 
At	 this	point	 someone	might	object	or	at	 least	be	puzzled	about	
how	to	square	(my	reading	of)	Suárez’s	view	of	being	with	apparent-












28.	Suárez	 states	 that	 the	 concept	 of	 real	 being	 is	 unitary	 precisely	 because	 it	
tracks	a	resemblance-making	feature	of	the	world	(DM	2.2.14,	XXV,	74b–75a).
analogy	occurs	when	‘F’	signifies	a	property	that	some	things	have	in	




(DM	 28.3.14).	 We	 could	 of	 course	 distinguish	 between	 various	 spe-
cific	ways	of	being	healthy:	being	healthy	for	an	animal,	being	healthy	
for	a	diet,	being	healthy	 for	a	 relationship,	and	so	on.	But	Suárez	 is	
concerned	 with	 a	 generic	 predicate,	 generic	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 ap-
plies	to	animals,	diets,	and	relationships.	Suárez	notes	that	the	generic	
predicate	‘healthy’	signifies	a	property	that	some	things	have	intrinsi-
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(4)	 Hence,	 there	 is	 no	 univocal,	 semantically	 primitive	
concept	 of	 being	 common	 to	 existents	 and	 beings	 of	
reason.
Premise	 (1)	 is	 based	 on	 the	 assumptions	 that	 (i)	 the	 primitives	 in	 a	
mental	language	track	resemblance-making	features	of	the	world,	and	
(ii)	 extrinsic	 properties	 are	 not	 resemblance-making	 features	 of	 the	
world.	Even	if	the	first	assumption	turns	out	to	be	mistaken,	the	argu-
ment	might	be	 re-stated	 in	 terms	of	an	 ideal	 language	whose	primi-
tives	 track	 the	 “perfectly	 natural”	 properties	 in	 Lewis’s	 (1983)	 sense,	





To	 be	 clear	 about	 the	 dialectical	 situation,	 Suárez	 does	 not	 offer	


























with	 real	 being	 in	 the	 first	 53	 disputations,	 and	 claims	 that	 seem	 to	
conflict	with	my	reading	can	be	read	as	being	about	real	being,	not	
a	generic	concept	of	being	 that	applies	 to	real	beings	and	beings	of	
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iv.	No	ontic	predicates	are	primitive.




to	 make	 these	 distinctions,	 since	 an	 argument	 for	 one	 of	 the	 above	
options	 might	 not	 support,	 and	 might	 even	 undermine,	 the	 others.	







is	 fundamental.	 I	propose	 the	 label	 ‘non-strict	ontological	pluralism’.	
If	 someone	wants	 to	 insist	 that	Suárez’s	view	 is	better	characterized	
as	non-strict	ontological	monism,	I	will	not	object,	but	the	important	













print’s	 referees,	 Martin	 Pickavé,	 Marleen	 Rozemond,	 audiences	 at	 the	 Uni-
versity	of	Groningen,	and	the	University	of	Notre	Dame’s	 	“Being	Univocal”	
conference	at	the	London	campus.




the	 Idle	 Hypothesis	 objection.	 In	 the	 end,	 Suárez’s	 claim	 is	 that	 ‘ge-
neric	being’	is	not	resemblance	tracking,	just	as	‘being	tin	or	close	to	
something	tin’	is	not	resemblance	tracking.	The	reason	for	this	is	that	
generic	being	is	extrinsic,	just	as	being tin or close to something tin	is	ex-
trinsic,	and	extrinsic	properties	are	not	resemblance-tracking.	Suárez	
thinks	 mental	 language	 is	 ideal	 insofar	 as	 its	 primitive	 terms	 are	 re-
semblance-tracking.	It	follows	that	mental	language	does	not	have	a	





ists’.	 ‘Objective	 being’	 cannot	 be	 primitive	 because	 it	 is	 an	 extrinsic	
denomination	and	therefore	fails	to	be	resemblance-tracking,	just	like	
‘being	seen’	 fails	 to	be	 resemblance-tracking.	So	while	Suárez	 recog-
nizes	multiple	ontic	predicates,	he	can	recognize	only	one	primitive	
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